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PLAIN TRUTH:

OR, A

LETTER

TO THE AUTHOR OF

DISPASSIONATE THOUGHTS

ON THE

AMERICAN WAR.

IN WHICH

The PRINCIPLES and ARGUMENTS of that AUTHOR are refuted, and the Neceſſity of carrying on that WAR clearly demonſtrated.

By the AUTHOR of LETTERS to a NOBLEMAN on the Conduct of the AMERICAN War; and of COOL THOUGHTS on the CONSEQUENCES of AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE.

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CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION Page 1

General arguments, proving that Great Britain cannot, conſiſtent with her own future ſafety, give up America, while the other Powers in Europe ſhall retain their Colonies - - 4

The motives which led to the American war vindicated - - - 5

The revolt of America at this time a fortunate event to Great Britain 7

The cauſes of our want of ſucceſs in the American war - - 15. 68

The means of our future ſucceſs - 19

The value and importance of America to Great Britain, and her ability to contribute to the national aids - 21

The policy by which the Colonies may be firmly united with Great Britain 29. 40

Arguments in favour of American independence refuted - - 33

The

The causes of the revolt of the Roman and British Colonies, and the means by which both might have been prevented Page 41

The position, that Colonies will naturally *revolt from the Parent State as soon as grown up to strength and maturity, refuted* - - - 45

The advantages supposed to arise to Great Britain from withdrawing our troops from America denied, and the arguments in favour of it refuted—and the mischiefs which must arise from that measure demonstrated - - 49. 58

France, Spain, and America, being united, we must reduce the power of all of them, or submit to the terms imposed by all - - - 54

No probability of our entering into advantageous treaties of commerce with America in case she should be independent 58

The arguments in "Cool Thoughts" supported 60

The loss of our nurseries of seamen, which must happen from American independence, not to be supplied - - 63

The Author of "Diſpaſſionate Thoughts" refuted by his own arguments Page 66
A general view of the arguments in "Diſpaſſionate Thoughts," and a refutation of them - - 69
The value of America to Great Britain, the juſtice of the war, and the probability of our ſucceeding in it, maintained 70
The Concluſion - - - 74

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PLAIN TRUTH,

&c. &c. &c.

SIR,

I HAVE carefully perused what you are pleased to call "Dispassionate Thoughts "on the American War;" which, I suspect, is not one of your first attempts to persuade the rulers and people of this country to cede to America her present independence.

The subject of your pamphlet is of great importance. It involves a question of no less magnitude, than whether it be consistent with the interest and safety of Great Britain to give up a great part of her dominions, and one-fourth part of her subjects? And as I perfectly agree with you, that no "good citizen" ought to with-hold

from his country ſuch aſſiſtance as it may be in his power to afford, I mean *diſpaſſionately* to examine your "thoughts" upon it. Nothing indecent or indelicate ſhall drop intentionally from my pen. I will ſtudy to emulate the "temper," which truly characteriſes your language, though I deſpair of approaching near to its elegance. Literary fame is not the prize I am in purſuit of. My aim is to unfold thoſe truths, in which the laſting intereſt and happineſs of our country are to be found. That once attained, my ambition will meet with the utmoſt gratification.

I will not detain you in conſidering your profeſſions reſpecting yourſelf, nor in making any of my own. Who I am, or what I am, cannot, or at leaſt, ought not, to detract from, or add to, the force of my arguments. The candid and judicious, who are ſteady in purſuit of truth, will not aſk the queſtion. And yet I will acknowledge ſo much of my political principles, as that I concur ſincerely with you in opinion, that "to be a ſubject of Great Bri-

"tain

" tain is to be the freeſt ſubject of any " civil community any where to be found " on earth;" and that it is for that very reaſon, I am obliged to differ in opinion from you, and to oppoſe what you have endeavoured to promote. For, in proportion as my attachment is to the freedom and welfare of Great Britain, I feel an anxiety for her invaded rights, and a zeal for her honor and ſafety; and I am thence led to believe, that, ſhould the meaſure which you recommend be adopted, neither her freedom nor her empire will long continue to exiſt with any dignity or luſtre, if they ſhould exiſt at all.

Under this perſuaſion, without further apology, I will proceed immediately to the buſineſs I have undertaken; in which, after I have made a few general remarks by way of anſwer to all your arguments, I will wait on you with particular attention, in the order you have laid down yourſelf.

Could you prove that the commerce of a nation does not depend on the numbers and induſtry of its people; or,

That the wealth of a ſociety, unconnected with mines of gold or ſilver, does not depend on the extent and value of its commerce; or,

That the reſources and ſtrength of a State do not depend on the number of its ſubjects, and the meaſure of its wealth; or,

That the Colonies belonging to the European powers have not contributed to their preſent wealth, ſtrength, and importance;

Or could you be ſo fortunate as to coax, by your perſuaſive pen, the courts of Paris and Madrid, and the other powers in Europe, into a belief that their Colonies are worthleſs and unneceſſary burdens, and in conſequence of that belief to give them independence; then, and not till then, can I agree with you, that it can poſſibly be conſiſtent

ſiſtent with the ſafety of Great Britain to adopt your meaſure. For it does not ſeem to require more than a plain underſtanding to perceive, that while the other powers in Europe ſhall retain thoſe nurſeries of people, thoſe ſources of induſtry, commerce, wealth, and power, it will not only be found policy, but abſolutely neceſſary for Great Britain, *in order to preſerve her independence among nations*, to retain in like manner her Colonies in due ſubordination. Becauſe, if ſhe ſhould be deſtitute of Colonies, ſhe will want thoſe reſources which her ſurrounding rivals and enemies command. Her power will be greatly diminiſhed, while thoſe of her enemies are conſtantly increaſing; the fatal conſequences of which are too obvious to be mentioned.

You begin your ſubject with ſaying, that "the original cauſe of the war in which "we are engaged with the Houſe of Bour-"bon, was our *ſquabble* with the Ameri-"can Colonies." Here, I think, you treat the American war with a levity not ſuited

ſuited to the importance of the motives which gave riſe to it. From this expreſſion, a perſon unacquainted with the nature of the controverſy, and the objects in conteſt, would imagine, that they were of as little ſignificance to the State as a *petty quarrel* between two London porters reſpecting the price of a mug of ale. But when we *diſpaſſionately* examine the cauſe of that *ſquabble*, we find that the matters in diſpute were of no leſs magnitude, than the rights of the ſupreme authority of a great empire over by far the greater part of its territory, and 3,000,000 of its ſubjects; rights which it had poſſeſſed, and which were undiſputed for near two centuries; and rights which it could not ſurrender, without ſacrificing its honour and ſafety. I wiſh, therefore, you had choſen a word more truly deſcriptive of the importance of this conteſt, as I wiſh not to believe, that you intended to make this deviation from the fact a foundation of your ſubſequent arguments.

To the thought I have remarked upon, you add, That " had we continued on " terms with America, it is probable, no " contention would *at this time* have pre- " vailed between ourſelves and France and " Spain." Ever happy in agreeing in ſentiment with you where I can, I readily acknowledge the probability of this conjecture. Becauſe we know, that France, though conſtantly preparing, was not prepared for war; and Spain had neither an inclination for, nor a thought of, it. But what will this conceſſion avail your arguments? Will it ſhow, although we ſhould not have had a war with thoſe powers, *at this time*, that we ſhould never, or even not ſoon? Will it prove, if the pretended cauſe of the Rebellion had not now happened, that America never would rebel? Or, will it convince any man of ſenſe, that the never-ceaſing ambition of France would not take advantage of a rebellion at a future day, when her preparations for war ſhould be completed, and when America would be more capable of reſiſtance?

For

For a " diſpaſſionate" ſolution of theſe queſtions, I appeal to your own candour. You know, that republicaniſm and diſaffection to the Britiſh Government were planted in America by the "firſt emigrants;" and that they have been growing up to maturity ever ſince. And your knowledge of the hiſtory of your own country has taught you, that the French, " theſe general " incendiaries of the world," as you juſtly ſtyle them, have never omitted an opportunity of taking every advantage of her diſtreſs. If Great Britain has ever been at war, France, almoſt without exception, has either been the original enemy, or ſoon joined in a confederacy againſt her. You alſo know, that, like the boar in the fable, ſhe has been, ever ſince the laſt peace, whetting her teeth, and meditating and preparing for war with this country; that ſhe had changed her former policy, and was bending all her powers in preparing a formidable navy, with deſign to wound Great Britain as ſoon as poſſible, where only ſhe is vulnerable.

Under

Under this view of things, can you believe, or can any man of common reflection believe, that the *general incendiaries of the world*, and who, you confeſs, will "be always ready to blow the coals of ſedi-"tion, to widen the breach, and to encou-"rage and aſſiſt the malecontents," would not join the Americans in a revolt whenever it ſhould happen in future?

If theſe be facts, what would it avail our country had the *ſquabble* with America not happened, and all had been peace *at this time?* It would, in my humble opinion, have proved the greateſt of Britain's miſfortunes. And under this idea of the matter, I can ſay, though perhaps from very different motives, with a late great Stateſman, that "I rejoice that America has "reſiſted;" fooliſhly reſiſted before ſhe was prepared, and lugged France and Spain, as great fools as herſelf, into the war, under the like circumſtance. For my own part, I confeſs, although I am not officially near the altar, or have a right to conſult the oracles, I have ever thought, from

theſe circumſtances, that it was a providential and fortunate event, if properly improved, both to Great Britain and America, that the Rebellion happened in the preſent period; that it would be the means of a more firm union inſtead of a ſeparation; and that that union, if founded in wiſdom, may be preſerved for ages to come.

The indolent Stateſman, who believes he lives only for himſelf, and not for his country, will, I doubt not, regret that the Rebellion ſhould happen *in his time*; and wiſh to leave every difficulty to his ſucceſſor, although procraſtination ſhould increaſe the danger of it to his country tenfold. But the truly patriotic Miniſter, whoſe generous mind comprehends the future as well as preſent good of his country, will rejoice to meet an event, the miſchiefs of which, in all probability, he will be more able than his ſucceſſor to ſuppreſs. He will conſider that our anceſtors have lived, fought, and bled for us, that we might do the ſame for poſterity.

After

After rather approving than condemning the ground of the American war, you ſay, " But the event has proved unfortunate.— " *Great* as have been our efforts, they have " been *all exerted without effect.* And " though it be confeſſed *our reſources are* " *ſtill conſiderable,* yet it ſeems difficult to " reconcile to any principle of reaſon, po- " licy, or experience, on ſimilar occaſions, " any expectations of better ſucceſs againſt " the united force of France, Spain, and " America, than we have hitherto ob- " tained when contending with America " alone." All this is more ingenious and plauſible than true. It will be found ſo upon an examination of facts, which you in other parts of your performance ac- knowledge. For although the exertions of the Miniſter in preparing for the ſup- preſſion of the Rebellion have been truly great and noble, and more than equal to the end; yet you muſt know, what all Europe knows, that the " efforts" of our generals have been infamouſly, I had like to have ſaid treacherouſly, indolent and inert. To this indolence the want of ſucceſs in

the American war has been owing; and not to the power in reſiſtance. And yet with all this indolence and want of ſucceſs, you acknowledge, what indeed is a well-known fact, that the people of America are " a ruined people; an exhauſted coun-" try;" that they are " bankrupts, and " beggars." Thus, while in one page, in order to ſupport the plauſibility of argument, you aſſert, that our " efforts" have been without effect; in another, you acknowledge the reverſe, and that theſe effects have been ſo great as to deprive America of all her reſources, and lay her at the feet of Great Britain; for ſurely " a " ruined people, an exhauſted country," muſt make only a feeble oppoſition to not leſs than 40,000 veteran troops, *whenever properly led to action.*

I differ alſo with you in opinion, in thinking that it is by no means " difficult" to reconcile to the principles of reaſon and experience, on ſimilar occaſions, a well-founded " expectation of better ſucceſs " againſt the united forces of France and " Spain,

" Spain, than we have hitherto obtained " when contending with America alone." I have already obſerved, that it was for want of exertion, not power, that we have failed in reducing America.—It was becauſe our generals *would not*, and not becauſe they *could not*, reduce her. No reaſonable argument can therefore be drawn from our want of ſucceſs. The only mode of determining the queſtion before us, is, candidly to conſider the preſent ſtrength and reſources of the contending parties. If, on comparing them, we ſhall find thoſe of Great Britain ſuperior, or even equal to thoſe of her combined enemies, then " reaſon" muſt tell us that there is a juſt " expectation of" better ſucceſs. And if they are riſing daily into yet greater magnitude, which is truly the fact, as I ſhall prove hereafter, then the moſt deſponding politician will have no room to doubt, but that the iſſue of war againſt all our enemies will be honourable to Britain, and enſure her future ſafety.

" Experience on ſimilar occaſions" is alſo againſt your argument, and fully ſupports my opinion. If we look into the hiſtory of the wars of this country, we cannot but ſee, that Britons ever enter into war with reluctance; and when entered, the councils and exertions of the State have been generally for a time weak and languid; and therefore it has rarely happened, in the firſt period of the war, that her arms have been crowned with laurels. Britons muſt be *handſomely* drubbed before their martial ſpirit can be rouſed. This has often been the caſe.—It was the caſe of the laſt war. What diſaſters, what loſſes, what defeats did we ſuſtain in the former part of that war! And yet, as ſoon as Britons became in earneſt, as ſoon as they became ſenſible of the ſhameful loſs of their honour and glory, their councils were directed by wiſdom, and their exertions carried victory and conqueſt over their united enemies wherever they were met; and, in the end, obtained a reparation of their injuries in an honourable peace. And ſuch, in all human

man probability, when every circumſtance is conſidered, will be the event of the preſent war, if the ſame wiſdom and ſpirit ſhall, as we have every reaſon to expect they will, be exerted.

Having proceeded to lay a foundation for your ſubſequent arguments on theſe miſtaken and fallacious principles, you urge the expedience of *ſome change* in our ſcheme of conducting the war: and you aſk, "What change ſo eaſy and practicable, and at the ſame time ſo likely "to produce favourable effects, as a total "deſertion of the American conteſt?" That it is expedient to change the ſcheme of conducting the war, I cordially agree. And I truſt it is either done, or will ſoon be done; that, from defenſive preparations, the war will be ſoon converted into vigorous offenſive operations. This, wiſdom and ſound policy moſt certainly point out as neceſſary to our final ſucceſs. And that ſome change is expedient in the mode of carrying on the American war, I alſo agree. But not the change you propoſe; becauſe,

becauſe, I am clear in my opinion, it would prove ruinous in the event to both countries; and becauſe another would be by far more "eaſy and practicable," and at the ſame time "much more likely to produce favourable effects." That country, I affirm, and, from the moſt perfect knowledge of the diſpoſition of the people, I am ready to prove by the moſt ſatisfactory teſtimony, contains a vaſt body of ſubjects faithful to the Crown; and that five out of ſix of its whole inhabitants ſincerely wiſh for a *perfect union in polity with this country*, from a thorough conviction that their future intereſt and happineſs depend entirely upon it. I will go farther in affirming, from my certain knowledge, that tens of thouſands are at this moment willing and deſirous to *aſſiſt Government in ſuppreſſing the Rebellion*, and *uniting with Great Britain againſt the power of the Houſe of Bourbon*. But, Sir, that war has been hitherto conducted, from the beginning, by perſons to whom the executive management of it has been given, on

on policy totally reverſe to all the dictates of common ſenſe.

When a General enters into an extenſive country of numerous inhabitants, the firſt thing pointed out by common ſenſe, as neceſſary to his ſucceſs, is to know if the people are divided in opinions; if they are formed into parties; and if any of thoſe parties are either diſpoſed, or can be perſuaded to aſſiſt him; and if any of them are friends to the meaſure he has undertaken, cordially to encourage, and with confidence to employ them. Now, it is known to every man who has endeavoured to make himſelf acquainted with the true ſtate of the Middle and Southern Colonies, that ever ſince the declaration of Independence, there have been two determined parties formed in that country; one, by far the majority of the people, zealouſly attached to their Sovereign, and the Britiſh Government. And yet it is alſo known to every man in America, and to every American who is now in Britain, and lately come from America, that until within a

few months, all the tenders of ſervice, all the numerous offers of aſſiſtance from the Loyaliſts have been rejected by our Generals. That while the Congreſs left no ſeverity uneſſayed to ſuppreſs their exertions in favour of Government, the Britiſh Commanders, co-adjutors of the Congreſs in the meaſure, treated them, and among them ſome men of the firſt weight and influence in America, with ineffable diſregard and contempt. Thus was the ſpirit of loyalty and affection to their Sovereign; thus was the moſt laudable of all principles, ground, as it were, between the upper and nether milſtone. And yet, like the faith of the three holy children when thrown into the furnace, their loyalty has ſuſtained the fiery trial, and remains inviolate to this moment.

Another inſtance of the folly and miſconduct in the management of the American war, was equally criminal with the one I have mentioned, and one of the cauſes of our want of ſucceſs. I have ever thought, that when a General

marches

marches out againſt his enemy, it is with deſign to meet him, and if ſuperior to him in force, to give him battle; and if ſucceſsful in battle, after defeat, to purſue, in order to take or diſperſe his force; becauſe every man of reflection knows, that after the collected force of an enemy, in a country without garriſons, as is the caſe generally in America, is once reduced, the country itſelf is conquered. This policy is ſo obvious, ſo conſiſtent with military duty, and the practice of great Commanders, that it is difficult to account for a neglect of it. And yet we have ſeen our Generals, at the head of a force which has been *ſix* times greater than that of the enemy they had to oppoſe, either ſleeping or rioting in their quarters; or indolently following, or ſhamefully retreating before, and often beſieged in their garriſons by, that enemy.

Now, Sir, from theſe circumſtances, I will preſume, in my turn, to propoſe "a "change in our ſcheme of conducting the "war;"—a change very oppoſite to yours; for inſtead of "a total deſertion of the

" American conteſt," I propoſe a vigorous proſecution of it. I am certain it will be more " eaſy and practicable," and leſs expenſive to the nation, " and at the ſame " time more likely to produce favourable " effects." It will be more " eaſy and " practicable," and leſs expenſive, becauſe it will take only one ſhip to carry the proper inſtructions to America. But to accompliſh your ſcheme, it will require 500 ſhips to bring from America to Great Britain near 40,000 men. And its " effects" will certainly be more favourable, becauſe I will pledge myſelf, that whenever it ſhall be carried into execution, it will immediately end the American war, which you agree is the ſource of all our misfortunes.

My propoſal is, to ſend over poſitive inſtructions to our General, to call to his aſſiſtance, by every reaſonable encouragement, the loyal force in that country; to ſeek the enemy, to give him battle, and to purſue the victory; to diſarm the diſaffected, and to embody and arm the Loyaliſts in every Colony as he conquers it;

it; or at leaſt, ſo many of them as are neceſſary for its defence. Whether this is not the moſt eligible ſcheme, I cheerfully ſubmit to thoſe who are beſt acquainted with the true ſtate of American affairs, and the real intereſt of our country.

Your next arguments are drawn from the little conſequence which you apprehend the Colonies will be of to Great Britain, ſhould they be reduced. You ſay, "Let it "be granted," that we ſhould be able entirely "to ſubjugate the Colonies, and "oblige them to acknowledge, in all caſes, "the ſupremacy of the Britiſh Legiſlature: "What ſhall we gain by our ſucceſs? And "what will be the real value and amount "of our victory? It would be well in"deed, if we could anſwer this enquiry by "ſaying—Nothing. But the true reply is, "Leſs and worſe than nothing. For," *you add*, "we ſhall have conquered only a "*ruined people*, an *exhauſted country*;— "and how many years muſt elapſe, in the "ordinary courſe of events, before theſe "inſolvent Coloniſts would have it in their "power

" power to contribute towards any public
" revenue !"

Here is a group of ideas ſo ingeniouſly put together, that they are well calculated to convince a ſuperficial mind, unacquainted with facts and careleſs in enquiry. But your premiſes are founded in miſtake, and therefore your concluſions muſt be wrong. The whole of this argument reſts on a ſuppoſition, that America neither is, nor will be, in any reaſonable time, of any value. To refute and flatly contradict this ſuppoſition, I will only appeal to thoſe facts which you yourſelf have unwarily acknowledged, when you thought they would anſwer a different purpoſe. Indeed, I find in ſundry inſtances, that the facts you make uſe of on one occaſion, and to ſupport one argument, are full refutations of, and contradictions to, another. For although in p. 13, when you are endeavouring to perſuade your country, that it will be impoſſible to draw, in a long ſeries of time, " any public re-
" venue" from America, and therefore to

give

give her up, you repreſent the Americans as a " ruined people," and the country as " an exhauſted country, worth leſs than " nothing;" yet in p. 27, where you attempt to prove that the Colonies will ſoon become independent of Great Britain, " in ſpite of our utmoſt endeavours to " the contrary," you ſpeak of the ſame country, as poſſeſſing all thoſe reſources from whence public revenue is drawn, in terms of high panegyric. You ſay, " That it is not ſurpriſing that a country, " circumſtanced like America, ſhould *ſo* " *ſoon* have acquired ſo formidable a ſhare " of power." You confeſs their " natural " advantages of *climate, ſoil, extent of* " *territory*, both by land and water, are " all favourable to *agriculture, trade,* and " *population*," the great objects of revenue; " and that the inhabitants poſſeſs a *ſpirit* " *of induſtry*, and *a thirſt for gain*," the very means which will enable them to pay it. And in p. 16. you acknowledge, that " in *half a century, probably*, the Colonies " might be able to riſe again to independ- " ence by the *force of their own natural*

" *reſources,*

" *reſources*, without any foreign aſſiſtance, " in ſpite of all our utmoſt endeavours to " the contrary." This mode of adducing two contradictory propoſitions to ſupport the ſame point in diſcuſſion, is truly ingenious: but at the ſame time it is miſchievous; it tends to miſlead; and cannot add to our credit as *ingenuous*, though it may as *ingenious*, ſeekers after truth.

If America poſſeſſes all thoſe " natural " advantages" which you have pointed out, ſhe muſt ſoon recover from her bankruptcy. If her people poſſeſs a ſpirit of induſtry, and a thirſt for gain, ſhe muſt ſoon become rich. If ſhe will be able in *half a century* to riſe into independence, ſhe muſt in a few years, " in the ordinary courſe of events," be capable of " contributing towards the " public revenue." And if, Sir, you are not ſurpriſed that an uncultivated and unſettled wilderneſs ſhould, " *ſo ſoon*, have " acquired ſo formidable a ſhare of power," you cannot in the nature of things be aſtoniſhed, that the ſame country, when arrived at a conſiderable degree of improve-

ment, and poſſeſſed of 3,000,000 of inhabitants, ſhould be *very ſoon* able to contribute largely to our public aids, and to add much to the national ſtrength.

But I will go farther and affirm, and not affirm only, but prove, that if America ſhould be reduced to its ſubordination and obedience to the ſupremacy of this country, ſhe will be able immediately to contribute to the public revenue. A little attention to known facts will ſupport this aſſertion. We know that ſuch are the reſources of that country, that ſhe has been enabled to advance, in the courſe of four years, at leaſt 40,000,000 *l.* ſterling, of the value of her property, and that ſhe has in the ſame time ſunk the debt accrued by that advance, by the depreciation of the money paid for it; and that too in ſuch a manner, that it is impoſſible it ſhould ever riſe into a debt upon her people. Hence the Colonies will have little weight of taxes ſhould we ſubdue them.

What then will be her remaining reſources, what the objects of taxation and revenue? Here I confeſs her reſources are conſiderably diminiſhed, but not ſo much as to render the revenue ſhe will be capable of paying "worſe than nothing." The cultivation of their land is conſiderably decreaſed. I ſuppoſe about one-third. Her commerce has fallen in the ſame proportion; and her monied men have ſuſtained conſiderable loſſes in the receipt of their depreciated currency. Such are the loſſes which ought to be deducted from the wealth and capacity of America to contribute to the public revenue. What then will remain as objects of taxation? The true anſwer is, Two-thirds of her former induſtry and commerce, and all her lands, which cannot be ſhort of 150,000,000 of acres in actual ſettlement.

Hence it appears, that the natural and true anſwer to the queſtion I have been conſidering, What we ſhall gain by proſecuting the American war, and reducing the Colonies, is,—We ſhall recover in territory

by far the greater part of the Britiſh dominions, and 3,000,000 of ſubjects; and with them we ſhall regain all the benefits ariſing from their induſtry, their commerce, their wealth, their numbers, and their ſtrength. We ſhall ſecure the greateſt of our nurſeries of ſeamen, and the only certain reſource we have of the moſt eſſential articles of our naval ſtores. We ſhall be enabled, independent of the caprice and intereſt, and in ſpite of foreign powers, at all events, and at all times, to maintain our naval ſtrength, which otherwiſe muſt ever be precarious, and upon which you acknowledge the very independence of Great Britain depends. For you confeſs, that "*Whenever our enemies can maintain "a decided ſuperiority over us at ſea, our "ſtruggles elſewhere are all in vain; our "empire in every part of the globe will be "totally diſmembered—and at laſt, the in-"dependence of this iſland itſelf will be "loſt.*"

The next argument you offer, is founded in the "diſcontent and heart-burnings"

which you ſuppoſe will remain in the breaſts of the Americans, " from thoſe meaſures " of ſeverity which have occaſionally been " exerciſed among them during the pro- " greſs of hoſtilities." This argument, in my humble opinion, proves too much. If it has any weight, that weight is equally ſtrong againſt the conqueſt of every country, againſt the ſuppreſſion of every rebellion, againſt the policy of obtaining reparation by the retention of countries after conqueſt, for any injury, however great, which one ſtate ever ſuſtained by the treachery or ambition of another. For, if the diſcontent and murmurs of a conquered people, or of ſubjects uninjured and yet revolting from their obedience, are objections againſt their being conquered or reduced, no country ought ever, in good policy, to be conquered, nor no rebellion, however groundleſs or unjuſt, ſuppreſſed. It holds up the moſt ample encouragement to the wicked and ambitious ſtateſmen of all countries to commit public injuries, and to violate the laws of nations, and to the ſubjects of every ſtate to enter into rebellion. And for

this

this reaſon, we daily ſee nations and ſtates prudently acting upon a policy directly oppoſite to what you adviſe.

Unleſs you will deny what has often happened in every age, you muſt acknowledge, that there is a policy and a practice by which all men, except the unciviliſed ſavage, have been, and may be reconciled to the ſociety and government by which it is conquered. Juſtice and generous treatment is that policy. The exerciſe of theſe virtues, immediately after the painful diſtreſſes ariſing from the ſeverities of war, have ſcarcely ever failed to change the ſentiments of men, and to convert, in a ſhort time, their averſions into ſettled attachments, to the government from whence they flow.

If this is the caſe in reſpect to a people altogether unconnected with the laws, habits, cuſtoms, manners, and language, of the conquerors, how much more ſo muſt it be with the Americans, of whom you ſay, that " the endearments of original an-

" ceſtry,

" ceſtry, and ſtill later connections; the
" arguments of language, religion, and
" ſimilar manners, will all operate in our
" favour. Prejudices, though now violent,
" may by degrees wear out. Short experi-
" ence of the tyranny and treachery of
" their new allies will convince them of
" *their miſtake in throwing off our yoke*;
" and as their preſent demagogues proceed
" in developing their long concerted plans
" of private ambition, and family aggran-
" diſement, *the eyes of the people will be*
" *opened to a full view of their duty and*
" *intereſt*; and they will ſee how truly
" they may conſult both, by cultivating a
" *laſting and ſolid friendſhip with Great*
" *Britain.*"

Such are your ſentiments when recommending the withdrawing our military force from America, and the giving to her independence. I have thought them ſo pertinent and ſtrong in ſupport of the oppoſite propoſition, for proſecuting with vigor the American war, that I have applied them to that purpoſe, cheerfully leaving our readers

to

to decide on the propriety of our reſpective applications of them.

One word more before I leave your argument founded on the ſuppoſed "diſcon-" tent and heart-burnings" of the people; an argument which has convinced me, that all your miſtaken ideas reſpecting the policy of giving independence to that country, have ariſen from miſinformation, or a want of knowledge of the true ſtate of facts. I fear you have either formed your opinions of all North America, from the conduct and temper of one or two particular Colonies, or that you have been miſled by the falſe teſtimony of intereſted men, who, to conceal their ſhameful blunders, have wickedly repreſented the Coloniſts as almoſt univerſally diſaffected to the Britiſh Government. Now, Sir, to put this fact in a true light, from a perfect knowledge of the diſpoſitions of the people of that country, I pledge myſelf to you, and to the people of Great Britain, to prove by the moſt ſatisfactory evidence, that a very

very great majority of the people of America are at this moment loyal to their Sovereign, and wiſh to be perfectly united in polity with the Britiſh Government, and to become perfect ſubjects of the Britiſh State.

If this be a fact, where is the danger of the diſcontent and heart-burnings in the Americans, which you ſuppoſe will be "propagated from father to ſon, and fre-"quently burſt out in tumults and diſ-"orders?" And where will be the neceſſity of "a very formidable military and naval "force, to ſecure that obedience," which, I have proved, ariſes from inclination, and a conviction that it is conſiſtent with their true intereſt and future happineſs? That ſome force will be neceſſary to keep in due order the licentiouſneſs of human nature in that as well as in every other country, I agree, but no more than, *and perhaps not ſo much as, is neceſſary for the ſame purpoſe in this.* But in that caſe, the Coloniſts are ready, and able, cheerfully to contribute to the national aids, in a juſt proportion

to

to their property and wealth; and what would we in reaſon and juſtice have more?

After thus in vain ſeeking for reaſons, in the ſuppoſed inutility of the Colonies to this kingdom, you proceed to argue from the "pecuniary burden which we ſhould "incur," by retaining America after we ſhall have conquered her. Here your imagination has formed the moſt fearful ideas of the millions which it would coſt Great Britain. And you ſay, that "the "moſt accompliſhed Financier we can "boaſt, might find it difficult, if not im-"poſſible, to furniſh ſuch ſupplies, in "addition to all our other indiſpenſable "demands." Now, all that you have here offered in ſupport of your fears, is truly ill-founded and viſionary. Not one article has any real exiſtence.

You gently touch upon the "pecuniary "burden we ſhall incur in the ſupport of "our Government in America." You give us no data to judge by, no calculation

of the amount of that " burden." Indeed I much ſuſpect that you have never made one; otherwiſe you would not have made the weight of the expence a ground of your argument. For it is a fact, which I have proved in the Pamphlet called " Cool Thoughts on the Conſequences of American Independence," and to which your " Diſpaſſionate Thoughts" are intended as an Anſwer, that both in the ſettlement and government of America, Great Britain has not expended more than 1,000,000 l. which, on an average, in the courſe of a hundred years, is no more than 10,000 *l. per annum;* a mere bagatelle, when compared with the immenſe advantages ſhe has received from the trade and commerce of America, in a tenth part of that time. I there alſo have ſhewn, that neither the ſettlement nor the governments of New England, New Jerſey, Pennſylvania, Maryland, the Delaware Counties, nor Virginia, have ever coſt the State one farthing. The truth therefore is, that this mighty burden, which you have fan-

cied muſt be ſuſtained by Great Britain, will, as it ought, be borne by America only.

Not chuſing to rely on the expence attending our Government in America to ſupport your argument, you proceed in your catalogue of viſionary burdens. "The "public debts contracted by the different "States during their oppoſition, muſt be "diſcharged." Did you ever know an inſtance, where one country became the conqueror of another, that the power conquering ever diſcharged the debts of the conquered? Do you imagine, that if it ſhould happen in the preſent conteſt, that France ſhould conquer Great Britain, which God forbid, that ſhe would levy money on the people of France to defray the debts incurred by Great Britain in the courſe of the war? In all the examples which hiſtory affords, has ever one happened, where the State has diſcharged the debts incurred by the Rebels in their oppoſition? Would not this be the ſtrongeſt of all encouragement to rebellion? Why then

can you imagine that Great Britain, ſhould America be conquered, will ever commit ſo great a folly, as to pay the debts of her ſubjects incurred in their Rebellion? "Individuals," you ſay, "muſt be paid for their loſſes. There will be little wiſdom, leſs policy, and no juſtice in that Government, which will pay rebels for loſſes ſuſtained by their treaſonable oppoſition to its authority. "The towns and villages (in America) muſt be rebuilt." There are no towns or villages of any conſequence deſtroyed; and if there were, they are the towns and villages of the rebellious, whoſe property, both in juſtice and in law, is forfeited to the State. And you conclude this ſtrange catalogue of burdens by adding, that the "means of returning into the old track of agriculture, navigation, and commerce, muſt be provided for them." From theſe poſitions, one would imagine, that you have conceived Great Britain is bound by ſome novel principle of juſtice, to make reparation for all the loſſes ſuſtained by her rebellious ſubjects, in the courſe of thoſe meaſures

meaſures which ſhe has been indiſpenſably bound to purſue for bringing them back to their duty; to rebuild every ſhip which has been captured under her own authority from the Americans; to repair every loſs which their merchants have incurred by their treaſonable commerce; and not only to do this, but to replace every ſhovel and ſpade which the farmer has worn out in the courſe of this treaſonable oppoſition to its authority. Theſe, Sir, are ſtrange ideas; they are as novel as ſtrange, and as repugnant to the practice of all States upon ſimilar occaſions, as they are inconſiſtent with reaſon and policy. They are ſuch viſionary notions, that you may be aſſured no Britiſh Stateſman will ever take it into his head to realize them.

Thus ſtand your objections ariſing from the expence which Great Britain muſt ſupport, ſhould America be reduced. And ſuch is the "load of immenſe weight," for which you have been pleaſed to figure to yourſelf, that "the moſt accompliſhed

"Financier

" Financier will find it difficult, if not " impoſſible, to furniſh ſupplies."

After thus arguing from the preſent worthleſſneſs and inutility of the Colonies, you proceed to conſider the future advantages ariſing from our renouncing immediately all connections with the Coloniſts as ſubjects. And you rely on a ſuppoſition, that, " in half a century, probably, they " *might* be able to riſe again to independ- " ence, by the force of their own natural " reſources." The reaſon you aſſign is, " for agreeable to the general revolution " of human occurrences, independent they " one day unqueſtionably will be." Here again, Sir, your argument proves too much. It will apply with equal force to the policy of giving up Ireland, or diſſolving our connection with Scotland; or indeed to that of relinquiſhing the independence of Britain. For in the courſe of " human occurrences," all theſe things one day unqueſtionably muſt happen. Empires and States have their births, growth,

growth, and diſſolution. Babylon, Troy, Athens, and Rome, had their exiſtences; they are now no more. Brittany, Gaſcoigny, and Normandy, belonged to Britain; Holland, to Spain; Corſica, to the Genoeſe; and Poland has been diſmembered. Ireland and Scotland have been independent kingdoms, and may, and probably will, be ſo again; they have great "natural reſources," which are rapidly riſing into improvement; their induſtry and their commerce are daily increaſing; they have vaſt tracts of territory uncultivated and unſettled; and when the ſpirit of induſtry and commerce ſhall be duly exerted, they muſt, in the natural courſe of things, become opulent and powerful, and looking back with regret on the loſs of their former independence, *may poſſibly* recover it again. But are theſe reaſons to induce us to renounce our connections with thoſe countries? to diſmember and weaken the Empire, and to haſten that diſſolution which, "in the general revolution of human "occurrence," poſſibly may "*one day*" take place? Will a Britiſh Stateſman ſuffer a ſickly imagination to form horrible phantoms of future

future miſchiefs, which may not happen in a thouſand years, and which may be avoided by true wiſdom and ſound policy? Or will he not carefully and ſtudiouſly apply that wiſdom to the prevention of thoſe miſchiefs, and to continue the exiſtence of the body politic under his care, whole, unmutilated, and in vigour, to the lateſt period of the greateſt longevity?

That there is that wiſdom to be found, by which, whenever exerted, the Colonies may be united in polity and due ſubordination to the State, for ages to come, cannot be doubted; and that Great Britain may retain them as perfect members of her State, as long as the other Powers in Europe ſhall retain their Colonies, reaſon and common ſenſe declare. Will it then be wiſdom in Great Britain to renounce and give up thoſe ſources of her wealth and ſtrength, while her neighbours, her rivals, her enemies, ſhall retain theirs? to diſmember and weaken the power of her national defence, while their reſources are daily riſing into greater importance?

Would

Would France, Spain, and Holland relinquiſh their Colonies? Then, and not till then, can any degree of prudence dictate the meaſure you propoſe.

The Britiſh, like the Roman Colonies, have been, in a manner, loſt by the erroneous polity in their ſettlement, and afterwards by the inattention of the State to a reformation of that polity. Neither of them were ſettled upon thoſe principles which reaſon and a ſmall ſhare of political knowledge clearly pointed out. The principles of their eſtabliſhment were totally different from thoſe of the Parent State, and conſequently tended to break in time the uniformity of the State. Rome, though a free Government, gave her Colonies too little liberty, and governed them for a time by her abſolute power. Great Britain, though a mixed Government, wiſely and excellently compoſed out of the materials of the three ſimple forms, gave to her Colonies *too much liberty*; by far more than accorded with her own eſtabliſhed polity, and even more than conſiſted with

true civil liberty itſelf. Her inferior colonial ſocieties were either formed into principalities *, with little more than a ſhadow of dependence or ſubordination, or they were perfect democracies †, in a manner independent. Thus Rome and Britain wandered, from true wiſdom and policy in the ſettlement of their acquired territories, in different and oppoſite extremes; extremes which naturally produced the ſame effects, the revolt of their Colonies.

But had Rome ſettled her vacant territory with *citizens*, and not *coloniſts*; had ſhe governed them by the ſame principles of polity, and given to them the ſame proportion of civil liberty, which governed, and were enjoyed by, the *citizen* at Rome, the cauſe of their revolt could never have happened, nor the revolt itſelf have taken place. And had Britain, in like manner, in the ſettlement of her Colonies, eſtabliſhed their inferior governments on the

* Maryland and Pennſylvania.

† Maſſachuſſett's, Rhode Iſland, Connecticut.

ſame principles of mixed polity, by which the people in Britain were ruled; and had ſhe incorporated and united them with her legiſlature, on the ſame principle upon which the people of Britain were united, they would not have thought of revolting, without ſome violent acts of oppreſſion to incite them to it. The ſeeds of diſaffection, ſowed in the heterogeneous principles of polity, which are to be found in their colonial ſyſtems, could not have exiſted; becauſe, as their general laws would in that caſe have flowed from the ſame fountain, and their particular codes would have been derived from polity of the ſame nature with that which governed the people of Britain, their political habits, manners, and attachments would have been the ſame. Thoſe political bands, that cement of national union and harmony, founded in one legiſlative authority, and ariſing from the ſame laws, habits, cuſtoms, and manners, which ever did, and ever will bind together the members of all ſocieties, would have bound the ſubject in America as firmly to the State as the ſubject in Britain. Educated

in the ſame political and national creed, Britons and Americans would have poſſeſſed the ſame faith. They would have heard with the ſame ear, ſeen with the ſame eye, and judged with the ſame underſtanding. Their national pride and honor would have been one, and their reſpect and affections would have been invariably directed to the ſame ſupreme head, from whence they equally derived all their protection and happineſs. All principle of revolt would have been excluded, and the State would have poſſeſſed the ſame political ſecurity for the obedience, fidelity, and attachment of the people in America, which it has for thoſe in Scotland, Wales, or any ſhire in the kingdom.

Theſe ſentiments are not novel. The principles by which they are ſupported, are to be found in every author of credit who has wrote upon politic law, and the nature of civil ſocieties; and therefore I cannot agree with you in thinking, that ſhould we " turn over a few pages of au-
" thentic hiſtory, either ancient or modern,
" we

" we ſhould ſee that Colonies, while in " their infant ſtate, are always humble and " modeſt; but as they riſe in ſtrength, " and approach maturity, they become " proud and inſolent; impatient even of " the moſt equitable reſtraint, and inceſ- " ſantly aiming at emancipation." I do not pretend to have read all the hiſtorians who have treated of Colonies. Some I have read, and I confeſs, I do not recollect to have met with this general rule in any of them. However, ſhould it be found in ſome of them, I muſt reject it as inſupportable by reaſon, and untrue; for I am certain, that every candid hiſtorian will tell us, that it was neither the " pride nor in- " ſolence" of the Roman Colonies, which led them to revolt. It was the " pride and " inſolence" of the State, which planted them in ſlavery, and debarred them from that freedom and thoſe rights to which they were entitled, and which they daily ſaw their brethren and fellow-ſubjects in the enjoyment of at Rome. And when we candidly examine the cauſes of the American rebellion, we know that they are

only

only to be found in the republican principles or erroneous polity originally eſtabliſhed in the Colonies, and in a wrong education under it, which naturally led them to revolt, and in no other cauſe whatever.

Your compariſon of Colonies with what every day paſſes in natural life, where the connection is much ſtronger, and more endearing, is ſo curious, that it deſerves examination. "The child," you ſay, "advanced to man's eſtate, and in poſſeſ-"ſion of the means of ſubſiſtence, with-"draws from the authority of the parent; "and though he may not formally re-"nounce his obedience, yet virtually, and "in fact diſclaims it, and too often refuſes "to the author of his being, and the guar-"dian of his minority, that attention and "regard which every principle of juſtice and "affection exacts in return." That a child ſhould "diſclaim" the authority of a parent, when his reaſon and judgment are arrived at maturity, is agreeable to the fitneſs of things, and conſiſtent with the nature of man, and the deſign of Providence; be-

cauſe

cauſe a variety of moral duties are charged to his account, which he is bound to perform, and for which he alone, and not his parent, is accountable. He muſt therefore exerciſe his own reaſon, and his own authority, in the execution of them. But the reverſe is the caſe of Colonies: they are ſettled with deſign to promote the intereſt of the State under which they are ſettled—and to remain connected with it, as ſubjects, as long as its exiſtence ſhall laſt. And this, according to the fitneſs of things, will ever be the caſe where they are ſettled under the ſame principles of polity by which the ſubjects in general of that State are governed, provided they do not inflict burdens too heavy for human nature to bear.

And as to a child's refuſing "to the "author of his being, and the guardian "of his minority, that attention and re-"gard which every principle of juſtice and "affection exacts in return;" this, I ſuſpect, is owing more to wrong education, and neglect in the parent, than to the nature of the child. On infancy, like ſoftened

wax,

wax, a virtuous parent may make what impreſſions he pleaſes. Virtue or vice, affection and reverence, or diſlike and hatred, it is certainly in the power of a parent to fix in the breaſt of his infant. If due attention and care are employed to inculcate the firſt, the inſtances are rare indeed, where a child can be found who has not paid that " attention and regard which " every principle of juſtice and affection " exacts in return:" and even after death, where the tear of filial affection and duty has not been dropped on the grave of his parent. This, I truſt, you, who have been educated as you have been, and profeſs what you profeſs, will not again deny, when I confront you with an authority from a book whoſe doctrines you ſo often recommend. " Train up a " child in the way he ſhould go, and when " he is old he will not depart from it."

Juſt ſo it is with Colonies. Train them up, when in their infancy, in thoſe principles which will teach them to love the Parent State; give them the ſame conſtitutional ſubordination; govern them by the ſame meaſure of power; and let them enjoy the

ſame

ſame meaſure of liberty as the citizen and other ſubjects enjoy; and they will not, becauſe they can have no motive to depart from their obedience. Do this, and they will ever love and reſpect the Parent State, whoſe protection never ceaſes, and from which they are daily receiving every bleſſing. Do this, and their particular and local "pride and inſolence" will be changed into national attachment; and their impatience of reſtraint be only a viſionary notion, becauſe that reſtraint will be impoſed by their own conſents, and become their own act, to which they will readily ſubmit. I ſay, do this, and the American Colonies, impreſſed by every motive of duty and intereſt, without one principle to lead them aſtray, will, as the Roman Colonies did, after their union in the ſame polity with Rome, adhere to the State, attend her faithfully in all her wars and diſtreſſes, *fight her battles, and expire with her.*

You proceed in attempting to ſhow other benefits, which would immediately ariſe

from " withdrawing from America every " ſhip, and every man employed in our " ſervice there." Having laid a foundation truly viſionary, you, with a facility of genius peculiar to yourſelf, erect a ſuperſtructure as romantic. " By leaving " the Colonies to themſelves, and renouncing all connection with them," you ſay, " we ſhall ſave not only every expence " which ariſes from the proſecution of the " war with them, but every charge which " may accrue by maintaining a government among them." And moreover, we are inſtantly " to acquire a ſuperiority " at ſea; recover our Weſt India dominions; relieve Gibraltar; carry our arms " into the dominions of our enemies; and " refund ourſelves a part of that treaſure " which their baſeneſs and perfidy have " obliged us to expend." Such are the pompous advantages which, your imagination has figured to itſelf, will ariſe from a meaſure, which, when candidly examined, will appear to be productive of the very reverſe of what you have predicted, and which will ſtamp the honour of your country

country with indelible diſgrace, infamy, and ruin.

As to the expence of ſupporting "our "government in America," I have already ſhown, that America is not only able to ſupport that burden, but to contribute to the national defence. And in reſpect to "ſaving the expence of proſecuting the "war with her;" permit me to aſk you, Should we, as you propoſe, "leave the "Colonies to *themſelves*," what ſecurity, what ſhadow of reaſon have we to believe that they will leave us to *ourſelves?* "Ir-"ritated," as you confeſs they are, "by "thoſe meaſures which have occaſionally "been exerciſed during the progreſs of "hoſtilities," will they inſtantly ceaſe to be our enemies? Will they immediately violate the moſt ſolemn treaties of alliance offenſive and defenſive, ſo lately entered into with the courts of France and Spain? And will they, without ceremony, in violation of public faith, and with ingratitude unparalleled, deſert their friends, who, however perfidious to us, have, with fidelity to

them, put them in poſſeſſion of their darling independence, the great prize of their ambition? Common ſenſe forbids the ſuppoſition.

What then muſt be the natural, the neceſſary, conſequences of the fatal meaſure you propoſe? The loſs of Canada, and our fur trade; of Newfoundland, and all our Fiſheries in the American ſeas, and of the greateſt and beſt nurſeries of ſeamen which we poſſeſs, is the firſt, though not the leaſt, of thoſe misfortunes which you are preparing the minds of Britons to meet. For can your moſt eccentric ideas conceive ſo great an abſurdity, as that the force which you have imagined ſo great as to be able to withſtand the Britiſh arms now in America, will remain an inactive ſpectator of the conteſt between Great Britain and the Houſe of Bourbon? Shall we not immediately ſee the military exertions of all America thrown into the ſcale of our combined enemies in the Weſt-Indies, giving them a decided ſuperiority in that quarter, and enabling them to ſubdue all our iſlands? But ſhould we be able to ſuſtain the con-

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flict in the Weſt-Indies, which is far from being probable, the European, as well as the American and Weſt-Indian ſeas, will ſuddenly ſwarm with American privateers. Our naval force withdrawn from America, the numerous privateers fitted out from New York being no more, there will be nothing to prevent it, but every thing to promote their naval military ſpirit. It will be more profitable to them than commerce during the war; and therefore their ſhips will be, for the moſt part, converted into veſſels of war, as ſoon as the danger ſhall be removed from their doors. Beſides, the number of their carpenters, the numbers of their ſeamen, and the plenty of all naval ſtores, will invite them to this policy in preference to trade. Hence we muſt not be ſurpriſed, ſhould your propoſal be adopted, to find the Britiſh commerce, in one year, reduced to the brink of ruin.

Nor will any man of ſenſe think this a chimerical or romantic fear, when he is informed of one fact: That from an exact computation of the loſſes ſuſtained by the

Britiſh merchants in the courſe of ſix months, and that even ſince the deſtruction of the Rebel marine and privateers, by Sir George Collier, at Penobſcot, it appears, that the greater proportion of their loſſes in their general trade, and two-thirds in their foreign trade, have been owing to captures by the Americans.

If by ſome magic potion you could lull America into a ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities; could you diſſolve her ſolemn treaties with France and Spain; and prevail on her to deſert thoſe allies who have fought her battles, and brought her forth into exiſtence, treacherouſly leaving them to ſtruggle with a war, in which they have involved themſelves for her ſake; and if you could prove, what you have in vain attempted, that the Colonies, as parts of the Empire, are "worth "leſs than nothing;" then, and not till then, can any thing leſs than folly in extreme induce Great Britain to adopt a meaſure ſo diſgraceful, ſo inglorious, ſo ruinous, as that of withdrawing her force from America. But theſe are utter impoſſibilities.

ſibilities. For the plain truth is, that France, Spain, and America, are our determined and united enemies; united by the ſtrongeſt of all obligations; by the moſt ſolemn treaties, by gratitude and intereſt. Thus inſeparably bound together, they muſt act in concert, and exert their whole powers againſt us. We muſt therefore combat and triumph over them all, or humbly kiſs the rod which ſhall unjuſtly ſcourge us, ſubmitting to the *degrading and ruinous terms impoſed by the intereſt, future ſecurity, and inſolence of all.*

Why then ſhould we foſter the viſionary hope, that a meaſure which will encourage America to proſecute the war with more vigour, which will enable her to recruit her waſted reſources and ſtrength, and to point them againſt us with more effect, will lull her enmity and her arms into ſleep, and take off her oppoſition? And why ſhould we ſtrive to damp and ſuppreſs the ſpirit of Britons, juſt as it is riſing into exertion; when we know that that ſpirit, when duly exerted,

has never failed, and is at this moment more than able to ſurmount difficulties of infinitely greater magnitude than thoſe in proſpect; to obtain juſtice, and to ſupport, among nations, the honour, the dignity, and independence of our country?

From the preſent, you paſs to what you ſuppoſe will be the future, advantages to Great Britain ariſing from American Independence. "In a certain ſpace of "time," you ſay, "opportunities will "offer, for forming advantageous treaties "of commerce with the American States." And in ſupport of this opinion, you plead a variety of ſuppoſitions, all which are clearly refuted in the Pamphlet entitled "Cool Thoughts," by incontrovertible arguments, of which you have thought it prudent not to take the leaſt notice. I ſhall, therefore, referring the reader to that Pamphlet, content myſelf at preſent with conſidering this poſition in a general light only.

That in a certain ſpace of time, the opportunity you mention will offer, I have no

no doubt; but whether it will happen in fifty, a hundred, or two hundred years, neither you nor I can ſay. The probability is preſumptively ſtrong, that it will not be ſoon. America has thrown herſelf into the arms of the conſtant rivals and enemies of Great Britain; ſhe is bound by gratitude to repay the benefits ſhe has received; and her feeble ſtate will, for a time, compel her to rely upon them for protection and defence, until ſhe ſhall riſe into power ſufficient to ſupport her own independence among nations by her own reſources. Her fiſheries, her raw materials for manufactures, her naval ſtores, and her mariners, will be all devoted to the ſervice of France, perhaps for a century to come. And what may be the ſtate of Great Britain, thus robbed of ſo great a part of her dominions, ſo many of her ſubjects, and ſo great a reſource of wealth and naval ſtrength, it is impoſſible to tell. Indeed, the independence of America is an event pregnant with a variety of conſequences of ſuch magnitude and importance to the

States in Europe, that it is impoſſible for the wiſeſt politician to trace them out, or even to form probable conjectures reſpecting them. In this dark ſtate of future conſequences only one thing is certain, and that is, that in the common and natural courſe of things, and according to all examples, they muſt prove, for a long ſeries of years, unfavourable, if not ruinous, to Great Britain, the country from whence America ſhall be wreſted; that this country will be ſinking into poverty and weakneſs, while her rivals and enemies will be riſing into greater wealth and power. This truth is ſo perfectly evident to our enemies, that it is the ſettled principle, and ſole cauſe of their alliance with America, and of their war with Britain.

But ſuppoſe Great Britain ſhould be able to ſtruggle under the loſs of ſo great and valuable a part of her dominions, and ſhould wait for this opportunity, when America ſhall no longer rely on her treaties with our enemies, but ſhall be capable of ſupporting her own dignity and free will

among

among nations, what certainty can we have of making with her advantageous treaties of commerce? Theſe treaties will be founded ſolely on her own intereſt and views of profit; this, and this only, will direct her policy. And to which ſide that intereſt may lean, whether to our own or that of our enemies, it is impoſſible to foreſee. It is more than probable that it will be againſt us; becauſe France and Spain having all the benefit of every raw material from America neceſſary to every kind of manufacture, will, in all probability, long ere this opportunity ſhall happen, be more than our rivals in manufactures, and underſell us at foreign markets; and if this ſhould be the caſe, what are the natural productions of this country peculiar to itſelf, which can give us the leaſt reaſon to expect an advantageous treaty of commerce with America, in preference to other countries? There are none. Indeed, there are few countries which naturally produce ſo few articles of commerce as Great Britain; and if her manufactures ſhould once ſink into decay, her commercial

alliance will be of little importance either to herſelf or to other nations.

I will now attend you in your attempt to anſwer a poſition in " Cool Thoughts." " The zealous advocate for the Civil " War," you ſay, " contends, that if we " give up America we loſe the Weſt-In- " dies." That you " cannot allow any " ſuch conſequence from ſuch premiſes." And the reaſon aſſigned for your opinion is, that " our poſſeſſions in the Weſt- " Indies depend on the *ſtrength of our* " *navy alone*." Now, this is the very argument which the Author has offered to prove the very reverſe of your opinion; and in ſupport of which, he has produced a variety of reaſons, whoſe force you did not chuſe fairly to meet. However, notwithſtanding you have prudently thought them unworthy of your attention, I will here repeat them as a full anſwer.

" With the independence of America " we muſt give up our fiſheries on the " Banks of Newfoundland, and in the

" American

" American ſeas. To the loſs of at leaſt " 35,000 American ſeamen *, we muſt add " upwards of 28,000 more, bred and main- " tained in thoſe excellent nurſeries. Our " valuable trade carried on from thence " with the Roman Catholic States, will be in " the hands of America. Theſe nurſeries, " and this trade, will ever remain the na- " tural right of the people who ſhall " inhabit that country. A trade ſo pro- " fitable, and a nurſery of ſeamen ſo ex- " cellent, and ſo neceſſary for the ſupport " of her naval force, will never be given " up, nor even divided, by America, with " any power whatſoever.

* " An Eſtimate of the Seamen employed in the American and Weſt-India Trade:

" Seamen employed in ſhips from Great Britain to America, - - -	28,900
" Seamen employed in the trade of America, " to the Weſt-Indies, France, Spain, Portugal, " Germany, and coaſt-wiſe, from one Colony to " another, &c. - - -	35,000
" Seamen employed in the Weſt-Indies to " America, Africa, and Europe, -	20,000
	83,900

" The

" The Britiſh iſlands in the Weſt-Indies
" muſt fall of courſe. The ſame power
" that can compel Great Britain to yield
" up America, will compel her to give up
" the Weſt-Indies. They are evidently
" the immediate objects of France, while
" ſhe looks forward to the advantages that
" muſt accrue from theſe acquiſitions, and
" the independence of America, viz. the
" ſovereignty of the Britiſh ſeas, if not of
" Great Britain itſelf. But if France
" ſhould fail to obtain the Weſt-Indies in
" the preſent war, America having re-
" covered and increaſed her ſtrength, con-
" firmed her confederacy, made her people
" unanimous, eſtabliſhed her navy, and
" ſettled her foreign alliances, all which
" ſhe may accompliſh in a few years, they
" muſt become a part of her union. Na-
" ture has planted them in her vicinity.
" They are as much her appendages, as
" the Iſle of Man or the Orcades, are thoſe
" of Great Britain. Beſides, the Weſt-
" Indies cannot well ſubſiſt without Ame-
" rica. Their ſupplies of proviſions muſt

" be obtained from thence; and America
" ſtands in equal neceſſity of a number of
" articles, which are to be obtained from
" the Weſt-Indies, and no other country*."

Finding that theſe truths are too evident to be denied, you, like an ingenious pleader, endeavour to avoid them, by offering to our conſideration the means by which the loſs of upwards of 80,000 mariners, a number nearly equal to the whole amount of the ſeamen now employed in the Britiſh ſervice, you imagine, may be ſupplied. Theſe means I will conſider, and give them the ſhort anſwers they deſerve. " They are adequate bounties,
" humane treatment on ſhip-board, and a
" more equitable diviſion of prize-money."
I do not know that we have ever been illiberal in our bounties, or that our mariners have been treated with leſs humanity than neceſſary diſcipline required; and I conclude, the diviſion of prize-money is in proportion to the rank and ſtations of the officers and men. However this may be,

* See " Cool Thoughts, &c." p. 25.

you

you certainly did not recollect that neither bounties, nor a different treatment, nor an alteration in the diviſion of prize-money, can anſwer the purpoſe where ſeamen are not to be had.

But even for this you have a remedy at hand; a vigorous preſs of all thoſe *without exception*, who have really no honeſt means of ſubſiſtence. And is it your policy, then, to mix herds of ſuch men as theſe, without experience, without a ſpark of private virtue, or national honour, with faithful Britiſh tars, whoſe breaſts burn with the love of their country? Would you truſt Britiſh fleets, and the glory and ſafety of your country, to beggars, thieves, and robbers? Truſt me when I tell you, ſhould the neceſſities of Britain ever compel her to rely on ſuch men for her ſafety, Britain muſt be low indeed!

In addition to theſe meaſures, you are for converting all our land forces into mariners, as if you thought the art and ſkill of a ſeaman would be infuſed into the minds of men by the ſight of a ſhip. But

thoſe

thoſe who I ſuſpect have more ſkill in naval affairs than either of us, have long thought, and ſtill think, that a regular apprenticeſhip is neceſſary to a knowledge of this art; and therefore have made it a rule, that no man ſhall be promoted in the navy without ſuch an apprenticeſhip. Hence I conclude, you have undertaken a difficult taſk, in attempting to perſuade the ſtateſmen of your country to intruſt its ſafety to inexperience and ignorance in the naval art. Thus, Sir, I confeſs, you have really puzzled me in determining which of all the means you have propoſed, for affording ample ſupplies for our navy, is moſt inadequate and viſionary.

A few words more, before I leave your particular arguments; and then I will conſider the queſtion in a general view. After ſaying ſo much, you take it into your head, that you can "anſwer at once, in "a few plain words, every objection "which can be urged againſt our abandon-"ing the American war." And theſe are the words which, *at once*, are to do the

 buſineſs.

buſineſs. " Is it poſſible, you aſk, to carry " it on? Have we not tried every method " in our power, and exerted every nerve " of national defence in order to ſucceed? " The truth is, impoſſibilities cannot be " performed. Humiliating as the fact is, " it cannot be controverted." Were poſitive aſſertions to paſs for reaſon and argument, you would here flaſh conviction on the minds of your readers. But men of ſenſe will examine them, and however " humiliating" it may be to one of us, you have compelled me to do it myſelf. Nor ſhall I find it a difficult taſk either to controvert or refute them. Indeed I need not look farther for the requiſite facts than in your own confeſſion. For you ſay, " though we allow there are many circum- " ſtances to alarm our apprehenſions, and " urge us to *diſpatch and vigour in our* " *exertions*, yet we deny there are any " which ſhould induce us *to deſpair*. The " French and Spaniards are the ancient " diſturbers of our peace; we have often " chaſtiſed their inſolence; and if our " whole ſtrength is directed againſt them,

" we

" we are *ſtill able* to vindicate our rights, and " do ourſelves juſtice againſt thoſe malig- " nant powers." And is all this to be done, if we have, as you aſſert, " exerted every nerve of our national ſtrength," in vain? If it has been impoſſible, by the proper exertions, to conquer a young country, in a manner without the reſources of war, without experienced officers, or diſciplined men, will it be poſſible, do you think, to " chaſtiſe " the inſolence" of two of the moſt powerful ſtates in Europe? It certainly will not. The truth, and the whole truth, reſpecting our failure in the American war, is, That although the reſolutions of the Cabinet have been noble and wiſe, and the exertions of the American miniſter have been amazingly great, yet our generals, loſt to all ſenſe of military duty, have ſlept when they ſhould have fought, have retreated when they ſhould have purſued. It has been a war of ſhameful indolence and diſgraceful inaction. Theſe are facts known to hundreds in England, and to every man in America, friend or foe. They are truths, however you may be unacquainted

with them, which our enemies have in their publications communicated to all Europe.

But more: Your generals have done every thing to obſtruct, inſtead of purſuing that policy which would tend to facilitate the reduction of that country. They have plundered without diſcrimination the loyaliſt and the rebel. They have, contrary to all the principles of ſound policy, contrary to the practice of all wiſe men, refuſed the tenders of aſſiſtance of numerous bodies of men, whoſe loyalty and attachment had been demonſtrated by the moſt incontrovertible evidence. And when a province has been conquered, not a ſingle ſtep has been taken to ſecure it. And when that meaſure has been propoſed, it has been treated with ſilence and contempt. In ſhort, it is known to every American, that that which ought not to have been done has been done, and that which ought to have been done has been neglected. What then do reaſon and common ſenſe point out to us, in order to perform thoſe impoſſibilities you have painted in your imagination, but

to undo what we have done, by reverſing the executive conduct of the war, and doing that which we ought to have done?

Having thus minutely attended you through all the verſatility of your arguments, you will permit me to take a general ſurvey of them. You ſay, you "diſclaim and reprobate" the American war. Now the proſecution of that war cannot be reprobated with reaſon and juſtice, but upon one of three principles; either becauſe the object in conteſt is of no value; or that the war is unjuſt; or that there is no poſſibility of ſucceeding in it. Had you ſupported either of theſe facts, I ſhould moſt heartily have concurred in opinion with you. Becauſe, however high my ideas of national honour may be, I ſhould have ſubmitted to the inſult at a time when that virtue ſeems to be little underſtood; even though I ſhould recollect, that in former times, when we had much leſs reſources, but much more public virtue, wars have been founded only on a defect in a punctilio to a Britiſh flag.

Becauſe,

Becauſe, if it be unjuſt, it not only ought not to be proſecuted, but reparation ſhould be made for the injuſtice we have done; and becauſe, if we want ability to proſecute it, common ſenſe tells us, that, however ſhameful, ignominious, and unjuſt it may be, or however degrading to the honour and ſpirit of Britons, we muſt ſubmit to the terms impoſed on us, or paſs under the yoke of our moſt perfidious and implacable enemies.

But, Sir, I truſt that upon a "diſpaſſionate" examination, none of them will appear to be the caſe. As to the little importance of the Colonies, ſufficient has been ſaid in this Addreſs, and in "Cool Thoughts," which remains unanſwered, clearly to demonſtrate the contrary.

To be convinced of the equity of the war, we need only take a ſummary view of the cauſe of it. The Colonies are undoubtedly members of the Britiſh State; they had been nurtured from their infancy up to adult age with parental care

and

and fondneſs; they had been protected by Great Britain at an immenſe expence of blood and treaſure, yet they refuſed, when perfectly able, to diſcharge the firſt and moſt important of all their political duties as ſubjects, that of contributing their proportion of aids towards the general ſafety, although their own was included. Line upon line, and precept upon precept, paſſed from Great Britain to the Colonies without effect; then, and not till then, did ſhe attempt to draw the aids, which are the ſubject of our preſent diſpute, from them, by the exerciſe of her lawful authority; an authority often before exerciſed by her, and as often acknowledged by them. The Colonies denied, and oppoſed that authority by arms; and thus was Great Britain reduced, either to the neceſſity of ſubmitting to the injury, and of giving up her ancient and juſt rights, or to arm in ſupport of them. Was this unjuſt? Does this merit your "reprobation?" Or was it not conſiſtent with that firmneſs and rectitude of ſpirit which glowed with unremitting ardour

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in the breaſts of our anceſtors, at a time when the effeminacy ariſing from too much wealth, and a diſſipation of manners, had not depreſſed the ſenſe of national virtue and national honour, nor had taught ſome of us to ſubmit, without ſhame or remorſe, to wrongs unparalleled, and to indignities the moſt diſgraceful?

And as to our reſources for carrying on the war, I may boldly affirm, that in no part of the hiſtory of this country they were ever greater, or ſo great, as at preſent. Is the credit of the nation, either at home or abroad, in any degree leſſened? Is the induſtry of our manufacturers, or the ſpirit of our merchants more abated than is common in time of war? Is not our trade as extenſive, and the wealth, which is conſtantly pouring in upon us through the avenues of commerce, as conſiderable? Has not the Miniſter raiſed the ſupplies for the current year without the leaſt difficulty? and is there not a good proſpect of their being obtained the

next, with yet more facility and on better terms?

Such is the ſtate of our reſources. If we look into our naval eſtabliſhment, we ſhall find yet leſs reaſon for the moſt languid mind to deſpond. In the paſt year we ſaw the whole combined force of our enemies, greatly ſuperior to that of Great Britain, traverſing the ocean without victory or ſucceſs; all our fleets, loaded with wealth, arriving in ſafety; and many millions in addition falling into our hands, by captures from our enemies. In the preſent year, we ſee our navy, by the proper exertions of a few months, and by our naval ſucceſſes, riſing into an equality of numbers and ſtrength. When we compare the numbers of our ſeamen, their ſpirit, and diſcipline, with thoſe of our enemies, we know their ſuperiority. And when we look into our dock-yards, we ſee them plentifully ſupplied with naval ſtores; and ſuch exertions on foot, as cannot in all probability fail to give us a decided ſuperiority.

If we examine the ſtate of our internal defence, we have nothing to fear. Great Britain and Ireland are in perfect ſecurity. Did we want more men to defend them againſt invaſion, they are immediately to be had; they have been offered and refuſed, becauſe unneceſſary. So that nothing is wanting to ſuppreſs the Rebellion, to bring our enemies to juſtice, and to make the traitor, as well as the foe, feel the weight of our juſt and indignant reſentment, but to direct with wiſdom and to exert the powers we poſſeſs.

Under theſe circumſtances, with ſuch reſources of power at command, with ſuch certainty of conqueſt and glory in proſpect, and with juſtice on our ſide, will the humanity of Britons ſuffer hundreds of thouſands of their fellow-ſubjects, who zealouſly revere the ſame Sovereign, love the ſame Government, and wiſh to be partakers of the ſame freedom, to languiſh under Republican anarchy, the moſt cruel and tyrannical of all deſpotiſm? Will that State which has ſo often, and with ſo much

much glory, ſtretched out its helpful arm to reſcue from perſecution and diſtreſs, even foreign nations, inhumanly refuſe to lend its powerful aid to ſave, from inevitable ruin, ſo many of her own faithful ſubjects, who, bound to her by all the ties of affection, policy, and intereſt, are at this hour depending on her juſtice and honour, and imploring her protection? Will Britain, ſo long the favourite of Heaven, and which has ſo often triumphed, and maintained in eminent luſtre her dignity among nations, permit her perfidious enemies, in direct violation of the faith of nations, and of all the rights and duties between ſubjects and their Sovereign, to wreſt from her by far the greater part of her dominions, and 3,000,000 of her people? Or are the arms of Britons ſo enervated—is that ſpirit which glowed in the breaſt of our anceſtors, and by which they have tranſmitted down to us our preſent freedom and bleſſings, ſo ſunk in diſſipation and effeminacy, as to be prepared to ſubmit to ſuch ignominious and ruinous terms, as the ſeveral intereſts, the enmi-

ties, and the inſolence of our enemies ſhall pleaſe to dictate? Britons, forbid it! forbid it, Heaven!

I am, &c.

MAY 27th,
1780.

THE AUTHOR.

P. S. Your "Diſpaſſionate Thoughts," in anſwer to "Cool Thoughts," having been publiſhed three months ago, I think an apology due, on my part, for not taking earlier notice of them. The truth is, that I never heard of them until the 20th inſt. when I accidentally met with them in my Bookſeller's ſhop. Had I been ſo fortunate as to have heard of them ſooner, I beg you will be aſſured, that I ſhould not have ſuffered them to have travelled ſo long in the world unattended by that reſpect which I think moſt certainly their due.

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